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ABSTRACT 
The belief that intentions are hidden away in the minds of individuals has been circulating for 
many years. Theories of indirect perception, such as the Theory of Mind, have since been 
developed to help explain this phenomenon. Conversely, research in the field of human 
kinematics and event perception have also given rise to theories of direct perception. The 
purpose of the study was to determine if intentionality can be directly perceived rather than 
requiring inferential processes. Prior research regarding kinematics of cooperative and 
competitive movements have pointed toward direct perception, demonstrating participants can 
accurately judge a movement as cooperative or competitive by simply observing point-light 
displays of the isolated arm movements. Considering competitive movements are often 
performed faster than cooperative movements, speed was perturbed for the purpose of this study 
to determine if participants are relying on cues or if they can indeed perceive a unique kinematic 
pattern that corresponds to intentionality. Judging the clips correctly despite perturbation would 
suggest perception is direct. Additionally, we hypothesized judgments accuracy would be higher 
in the presence of two actors pointing to the use of interpersonal affordances. Twenty-eight 
participants from the University of Central Florida were asked to judge 40 clips presented in 
random order including: normal or perturbed competitive actions with one or two actors; normal 
or perturbed cooperative actions with one or two actors. Percent correct and reaction time data 
were analyzed on SPSS using a repeated measures ANOVA. Results rejected the hypothesis that 
social perception is direct and supported indirect perception, indicating participants relied on 
cues to make judgments, and provided potential support for the interpersonal affordance 
hypothesis.   
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Problems and Theories in Social Perception 
A common belief is that intentions and mental states are hidden away in the mind of each 
individual; in philosophy of mind, this is known as the problem of other minds. How do we 
know what other people are thinking, or even whether they have a mind at all? Humans are said 
to develop a Theory of Mind (ToM) at a young age to understand the mental states of others. 
Theory of Mind is the notion that humans can ascribe mental states to other individuals without 
any direct access to their actual mental states. Humans may either formulate inferences regarding 
the mental states of others (Theory-Theory or TT) or make attributions of mental states based on 
the individual’s own mental states and experiences (Simulation-Theory or ST) (Gallagher, 2008). 
The problem of other minds arises as a product of these inferential processes (i.e. TT and ST) 
because, as is generally believed, one’s own mind is the only mind that can be known to exist 
and one’s own mental states are the only ones that can be directly experienced. This suggests that 
intentions are hidden away in the minds of the acting agents in the world and can, therefore, not 
be known by other perceiving agents. Understanding the mechanisms underlying social 
perception has the potential to shed light on the problem of other minds and improve our 
understanding of the nature of ToM. 
While these theories describe different approaches, the common theme is that social 
perception is a form of cognition and reasoning (Wiltshire et al., 2015). These traditional 
accounts of ToM have been studied for many years. While research in the field provides 
evidence to support this account, it is important to further evaluate these studies. Research on 
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ToM often consists of making observational judgments based on pictures and videos, thus 
creating a “third person” perspective on the situation (Di Paolo & De Jaegher, 2012; Przyrembel 
et al., 2012). While this form of stimulus can depict real life situations, it does not provide 
realistic engagement. Realistically, an opportunity for social perception would truly be present 
during actual social interaction. Interaction is an important component to social perception. 
Interaction Theory (IT) focuses on the “interaction” aspect of social perception. This theory 
proposes that the perception of others’ mental states is direct and requires no inferential 
processes, such as those proposed by TT and ST (Gallagher, 2008; Gallagher & Varga, 2013).  
Research by Tylen and colleagues (2012) shows that social observation and social 
interaction activate different brain regions. During their study, participants observed a person 
manipulating an object individually and a person showing an object to a partner. While 
observing individual manipulation, prefrontal cortex, right inferior gyrus, and right inferior 
parietal lobule areas were activated. During the interactive condition, there was greater activation 
in the posterior temporal sulcus, which plays a role in continuous fine-grained temporal 
navigation and stimulus integration related to responsiveness during social interactions (Tylen et 
al., 2012). Differences in activation suggest there is unique information available to the perceiver 
during active engagement in social interaction that is unavailable during individual action.  
While this does not address whether or not social perception is an inferential process, it provides 
important information about how to approach the study of social perception, as it raises 
implications about the significance of social interaction in the study of social perception.  
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Affordances and Theory of Direct Perception 
This idea that intentionality resides only in the mind appeals to the dualistic notion that 
the mind exists separately from the brain and the body. However, many of the cognitive 
processes exhibited by humans are a product of a tightly coupled perception-action cycle 
(Gibson, 1979). Essentially, humans perceive to act and act to perceive. That is to say, there 
would be no end, or purpose, to perception if an individual could not act upon what is perceived. 
Likewise, perception would be impossible without an agent in the world acting on affordances. 
Affordances are opportunities for action in the world that correspond reciprocally to the 
perceiver and what is being perceived. Perception of the world is therefore direct. Gibson’s 
(1979) theory of direct perception proposes the existence of invariant patterns in optic flow that 
are only present when the affordance is present.  
The concept of affordances is often used to describe personal affordances, or 
opportunities available to the individual. For example, individuals can directly perceive the 
“climbability” of a staircase by simply observing different riser heights and judging the stairs as 
climbable or unclimbable (Warren, 1984). Humans are also able to directly perceive the 
“passability” of a walkway by observing different aperture widths and making judgments 
(Warren & Whang, 1987). It is important to distinguish between human action involving 
inanimate objects and human to human interaction. As stated by Gibson (1979), conspecifics 
afford many complex interactions such as communicating, fighting, nurturing, mating, and 
cooperating. Affordances involving interaction between two individuals can be called 
interpersonal affordances. These interpersonal affordances grant animals and humans access to 
opportunities for action otherwise unavailable to the individual, such as verbal and non-verbal 
 
4  
behavior and coordinated action (McArthur & Baron, 1983; Valenti and Good, 1991; Kono, 
2009). Some interpersonal affordances can involve multi-modal behaviors between agents 
working on a collaborative task, including facial expressions and gestures (Louwerse et al., 
2012). Other examples include changes in kinematic patterns observed when one interactor 
requests to be fed by opening of the mouth or gaze direction (Ferri et al., 2011). 
Interpersonal affordances are only present in a social interaction context, therefore the 
pattern for an interactive action will not be present or perceivable if there is no interaction. 
Communicative intent, for example, is an interactive action. An individual can only 
communicate in the presence of another person. Sartori et al. (2009a) found that movements 
made with the intention to communicate are performed slower and more carefully than 
individual movements. Similarly, Becchio et al. (2008a) observed that grip closing velocity and 
maximal finger aperture and grip closing velocity decrease significantly when an item is grasped 
to be passed to a partner compared to being grasped individually. Sudden perturbations in 
individual intentions involving interacting agents have also demonstrated changes in spatial 
trajectories. When participants were asked to place an object individually on a target, a partner 
would suddenly stretch out her arm to ask for the object. This study revealed significant veering 
of the arm, thus overriding the initial motor plan (Sartori et al., 2009b). However, no such effects 
occurred when the human partner was replaced by a robot. These findings suggest an 
interpersonal affordance, or opportunity for action only present and perceivable between two 
humans interacting. Interpersonal affordances can provide the individual direct information 
about the interaction and the action necessary to interact efficiently.  
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Affordances exist to be used by the perceiver and require no inferential processes to be 
perceived. In contrast to the theory of direct perception, the classical theory of indirect 
perception proposes that the senses are meaningless and cannot be trusted, therefore, must be 
inferred. The theory of indirect perception thus supports the ToM hypothesis, suggesting that, in 
this case, social perception is an inferential process. On the other hand, the theory of direct 
perception raises implications about the importance of interpersonal affordances serving as a 
basis for direct social perception. 
Embodied Cognition 
New ideas in cognitive science are consistent with ideas of direct social perception and 
the importance of interaction. The embodied cognition hypothesis, in this context, suggests that 
the mind is not the only cognitive resource responsible for complex human behavior and 
interaction (Wilson & Golonka, 2013). Cognition, instead, manifests itself in the body of the 
agent. Research shows that human gait patterns can be reproduced by robots without motors or 
onboard algorithms through careful assembly (Collins et al., 2005), suggesting that gait is the 
direct result of a particular embodiment. Other findings suggest that social interaction might be 
embodied. Female crickets, for example, select a mate based on which male cricket produces the 
loudest song (Barett,2011). Female crickets’ eardrums are located on their two front legs and 
receive directional information about the sound based on amplitude. The eardrums are connected 
to small interneurons that control turning and respond to a specific frequency produced by the 
male cricket. Female crickets thus follow the direction of the most active interneuron in order to 
find a mate. This process is a form of embodiment and requires no inferential process by the 
female cricket. Children also exhibit signs of embodied cognition at a young age. Children 
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between 7 and 12 months exhibit the A-not-B error when asked to retrieve a hidden object 
(Thelen et al., 2001). After being hidden under location A multiple times, the object is then 
hidden in location B in front of the child. The child still reaches for location A. However, 
observation of looking behavior shows that children look at error trials longer suggesting they 
know something went wrong. While the child possesses the knowledge of where the object is 
located, the reaching dynamics cannot yet access this information, suggesting skills believed to 
entail cognition are instead embodied. An embodied view of cognition sets forth the possibility 
that an agent’s mental states and intentions may be externalized and thus directly perceived by an 
interacting agent in a social context. Embodied cognition thus replaces the notion that perception 
of intentions and mental states are hidden away and can only be inferred. This hypothesis 
supports the idea that social intention is directly perceivable. 
Event Perception and the Principle of Kinematic Specification of Dynamics 
Human action has unique characteristics that can be distinguished between events. The 
concept of event perception highlights the unique qualities of different events. Johansson (1973) 
studied event perception using the point-light technique. The point-light technique consisted of 
the attachment of small lights to the joints of actors and filming them walking in the dark. 
Participants were then asked to judge the action, which participants accurately identified as 
walking (Johansson, 1973). In a different study, participants were asked to distinguish biological 
from non-biological motion using humans and marionette puppets wearing point-lights and 
exhibiting the same actions (Johansson, 1976). Despite the spatial pattern similarity, participants 
were able to accurately distinguish biological from non-biological motion. Additionally, humans 
can accurately determine an actor’s intention to deceive by observing only kinematic information 
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(Runeson & Frykholm, 1981). In this study, the actors wearing reflective tape on their major 
joints were asked to lift a light box and pretend it was heavy. Participants were able to accurately 
judge the weight of the box as well as the actor’s intention to deceive. The examples above 
support the principle of kinematic specification of dynamics, which states that kinematic patterns 
contain enough information to specify underlying dynamic properties. In this context, dynamics 
refers to the underlying causal forces of the movement, which are intentions. Many other studies 
have demonstrated how kinematic patterns alone provide information about a point-light 
walker’s sex (Kozlowski & Cutting, 1977) and identity (Cutting & Kozlowski, 1977). The 
kinematic information is therefore directly perceivable by observing agents. 
Modern Research in Direct Social Perception 
Georgiou et al. (2007) found different movement time, amplitude of peak velocity and 
deceleration time for competitive vs. cooperative movements suggesting a unique kinematic 
pattern for each intention. According to Becchio et al. (2008b), when individuals are cooperating 
with a partner displaying the intention to compete, the cooperative partner’s kinematic pattern 
changes to match a pattern similar to the competitive one. Similarly, participants can 
discriminate between cooperative vs. competitive movements by observing temporally occluded 
clips of reach to grasp kinematics (Sartori et al., 2011) as well as point-light displays of the same 
movements (Manera et al., 2011). These results lend empirical support to the idea of direct social 
perception enabled by the different kinematic patterns of social interaction. A major concern 
surrounding the discrimination between competitive and cooperative movements by observers is 
that the speed of the movements may characterize the intentions, as competitive movements are 
often faster than cooperative movements. Although Sartori et al. (2011) and Manera et al. (2011) 
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compared cooperative vs. slow and competitive vs. fast in addition to fast vs. slow and 
competitive vs. cooperative, participants could more accurately distinguish fast vs. slow and 
cooperative vs. competitive. This raises the question of whether participants are using other cues, 
namely speed, to determine whether the movement is cooperative or competitive. If true, this 
would imply that movement speed acts as a social cue for perceptual inference and would be 
consistent with the Theory of Mind perspective. If the direct social perception hypothesis is to be 
valid, cooperative and competitive movements should each exhibit unique spatio-temporal 
trajectories that mirror the actor’s intention despite how fast or slow the movement is performed.  
Hypothesis 
One way to test these claims is by perturbing the speed of the action kinematics. Eight 
different stimuli were created using point-light displays of reach to grasp movements: 
competitive-normal speed, 1 actor; competitive-normal speed, 2 actors; competitive-fast speed, 1 
actor; competitive-fast speed, 2 actors; cooperative-normal speed, 1 actor; cooperative-normal 
speed, 2 actors.  The direct social perception hypothesis would predict that observers should 
maintain correct judgments across the speed perturbation. If the perturbation induces judgment 
errors, this would support the Theory of Mind hypothesis. Likewise, the interaction theory 
predicts that judgments will be more accurate when two actors are visible instead of 1. Findings 
would suggest the presence, perception, and use of interpersonal affordances during social 
observation.   
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CHAPTER 2: METHODS 
Participants 
Twenty-Eight young adults (N = 28) ranging from 18-47 years of age (median age = 19; 
female = 15, male = 13) were recruited to participate in this study Participants reported normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision.  Participants were recruited from the University of Central Florida’s 
Psychology department’s participant pool website. Participants received extra or partial course 
credit in exchange for their participation. 
Materials 
The materials consisted of eight video clips of actors performing competitive or 
cooperative movements. Action kinematics were isolated using the point-light technique. 
Reflective tape was placed on the actors’ major arm joints (shoulders, elbow, wrist, and hand). 
Actors wore black clothing, and all other surfaces in the background were covered in black cloth. 
The displays were filmed using a Sony Digital Handicam at 30fps, with aperture settings 
adjusted to reduce the amount of light admitted by the camera. Room lights were turned off, and 
the actors were illuminated with a single spotlight from a 4.5W LED bulb placed at a distance of 
approximately 2.1 meters and located directly above the video camera. In the interaction, the 
actors performed a task of each placing an 8.9cm square foam block, visible in the display, in the 
center of the table. Each video clip was edited so that it began just as the reaching movement 
began and ended as soon as the blocks were placed. Further, video editing software was used to 
isolate the visibility of just the reflective patches. This was achieved using a manipulation of 
brightness contrast, a monochromatic filter, and a posterizing filter. Participants were not 
involved in the stimulus generation process.  
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Cooperative-Normal Speed, 2 Actors: Actors were instructed to work together to 
place blocks neatly in the center of the table. Video was presented at normal 
speed. The duration of this clip is 0.968 sec.  
Cooperative-Fast Speed, 2 Actors: Actors were instructed to work together to 
place blocks neatly in the center of the table. This video was sped up to be similar 
to the competitive speed, resulting in a duration of 0.367 sec. 
Cooperative-Normal Speed, 1 Actor: Two actors were instructed to work together 
to place blocks neatly in the center of the table. The video was cropped to display 
only one actor and was presented at normal speed with a duration of 0.934 sec. 
Cooperative-Fast Speed, 1 Actor: Two actors were instructed to work together to 
place blocks neatly in the center of the table. The video was cropped to display 
only one actor and was sped up to match competitive speed with a duration of 
0.367 sec. 
Competitive-Normal Speed, 2 Actors: Two actors were instructed to compete by 
attempting to place their blocks on the table first. The video was presented at 
normal speed with a duration of 0.367 sec. 
Competitive-Slow Speed, 2 Actors: Two actors were instructed to compete by 
attempting to place their blocks on the table first. The video was slowed down to 
match cooperative speed with a duration of 0.967 sec.  
Competitive-Normal Speed, 1 Actor: Two actors were instructed to compete by 
attempting to place their blocks on the table first. The video was cropped to 
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display only one actor and was presented at normal speed with a duration of 0.367 
sec. 
Competitive-Slow Speed, 1 Actor: Two actors were instructed to compete by 
attempting to place their blocks on the table first. The video was cropped to 
display only one actor and was slowed down to match cooperative speed with a 
duration of 0.967 sec. 
 The video clips were presented on a 27-inch screen BenQ XL2730Z gaming monitor with 
a resolution of 2560 × 1440, a 120 Hz refresh rate, and a 1ms gray-to-gray latency which 
minimizes pixel ghosting and improves motion displays. To run the experiment, a Dell Precision 
workstation T3500 running Windows 7 was used. E-Prime was used for stimulus presentation 
and response recording, including reaction time data. Data was analyzed using SPSS. 
Additionally, participants completed a demographic questionnaire  
Procedure 
 The study took place in Room #306 of the University of Central Florida’s Psychology 
department. Participants were welcomed into the lab and provided with an informed consent 
form. After reading the form and consenting to participate in the study, they were asked to 
complete a short demographic questionnaire. After completing the questionnaire, participants 
were seated in a standard office chair facing the display at a distance of approximately 70cm. A 
standard keyboard was placed on the desk between the display and the participant. 
The stimuli consisted of the eight video clips presented five times each, for a total of 40 
clips presented in random order. Participants were asked to make judgments by pressing a key on 
the keyboard as instructed (1 for competitive, 0 for cooperative), using a two-alternative forced 
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choice between competitive and cooperative. Participants were instructed to respond quickly 
while still trying to be as accurate as possible. The study session lasted approximately 5 minutes.  
CHAPTER 3: RESULTS 
 Outlier checking was conducted based on the RT data across 1120 total trials. Trials with 
an RT greater than 3SD (RT > ~8s) from the mean were excluded from subsequent analysis. 
Fifteen such trials were removed, leaving 1105 total trials remaining in the dataset, with a final 
mean RT = 1.50s. Of the trials removed, 6 were cooperative displays, 9 were competitive, and 9 
involved speed perturbations, while 6 were normal speed displays. From the remaining data, 
mean percent correct and mean RT was calculated for each of the 8 conditions, which were 
subsequently analyzed using repeated-measures 2×2×2 ANOVA.  
Analysis of Percent Correct Data 
Assumption of homogeneity of covariance was checked using Mauchly’s Test of 
Sphericity, which was not significant, indicating the assumption was not violated. There was a 
main effect of intention on percent correct judgments, with competitive videos (64.4% correct) 
judged more accurately than cooperative videos (52.80%), F(1,27) = 12.04, p = .002, partial 2  
= .31. Next, we found a main effect of the speed of the video, with normal speeds (82.7% 
correct) judged more accurately than perturbed speeds (34.5% correct), F(1,27) = 46.00, p < 
.001, partial 2  = .63. There was no significant main effect of the number of actors, F(1,27) = 
1.67, p = .21, partial 2  = .06.   
There was a significant interaction between intention and speed. The effect of the speed 
manipulation was more pronounced on cooperative displays (63.1% difference) compared to 
competitive displays (33.3% difference), F(1,27) = 20.03, p < .001, partial 2  = .43. This effect 
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is depicted in Figure 1. There was no interaction between speed and number of actors in the 
display, F(1,27) = 2.98, p = .10, partial 2  = .01. The percent correct difference between normal 
and perturbed displays was 52% for the 1-actor condition and 45.3% for the 2-actors condition 
(Figure 2). A significant interaction was found between intention and number of actors, F(1,27) 
= 11.04, p = .003, 2 = .29, pointing to an increased accuracy for cooperative displays and a 
decreased accuracy for competitive displays in the presence of two actors (Figure 3). No 
significant three-way interaction was found between intention, speed, and number of actors 
F(1,27) = .02, p = .90, 2= .001.  
 
Figure 1. Significant interaction between movement intention and speed manipulation on percent correct 
data. The effect of the speed perturbation is more pronounced for cooperative displays. 
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Figure 2. Significant interaction between movement intention and number of actors visible in the display on 
percent correct data. The presence of two actors decreased accuracy in competitive displays but increased accuracy 
in cooperative displays. 
Analysis of Reaction Time Data 
 There was a main effect of intention on RT, with competitive displays (1.66s) having 
longer RT than cooperative displays (1.41s), F(1,27) = 33.61, p <.001, 2 = .56. The main effect 
of number of actors was not significant, F(1,27) = .06, p = .82, partial 2 = .002. A significant 
main effect for speed was found. Participants exhibited longer RTs for perturbed displays (1.67s) 
compared to normal displays (1.39s), F(1,27) = 19.0, p < .001, partial 2 = .41.A significant 
interaction between speed and intention revealed that the speed perturbation increased RT only 
for competitive displays (mean difference = 0.76s) while the perturbation decreased RT in 
cooperative displays (mean difference = -0.20s), F(1,27) = 65.1, p  < .001, partial 2  = .71 
(Figure 4). There was no significant interaction between intention and number of actors, F(1,27) 
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= .01, p = .91, partial 2  = .00. There was also not a significant interaction between number of 
actors and speed, F(1,27) = 3.61, p = .07, partial 2  = .12. Finally, a significant three-way 
interaction was found between number of actors, speed, and intention, F(1,27) = 10.5, p = .003, 
partial 2 = .28, signifying an increased RT not only for competitive displays, but particularly for 
those containing only one actor (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 3. Interaction between movement intention and speed manipulation on RT data. Note the increase in 
RT in particular for the perturbed competitive displays. 
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Figure 4 and 5. Significant three-way interaction on the RT data, revealing longest RT for competitive 1-
actor perturbed displays. The effect of the speed perturbation is most pronounced in the competitive 1 actor 
condition. 
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION 
The goal of this study was to determine whether the intentions of others can be directly 
perceived or if they require inferential processing. We hypothesized that judging actors’ 
intentions correctly despite perturbation in the speed of the movements would suggest social 
perception is direct. Additionally, we hypothesized that more accurate judgments in clips 
showing two actors would suggest the perception and use of interpersonal affordances. However, 
the difference in accuracy between normal and perturbed speed fails to support the direct 
perception hypothesis.  
We also note that the effect of the speed perturbation was greater in the cooperative 
condition than the competitive displays, suggesting the perturbation was more pronounced in the 
former. The current methods are insufficient to explain this finding, but the analysis of reaction 
time data showed an increase in RT for perturbed competitive displays and a decrease in RT for 
perturbed cooperative displays. We may conclude from this that the perturbation increased the 
“computational load” of the participant while observing competitive displays, indicating use of 
cues, but that this increase in workload revealed a possible compensatory mechanism that 
resulted in improved judgments in the perturbed competitive videos. The findings reject the 
hypothesis that social perception is direct.  
Despite the lack of support for the direct perception hypothesis in terms of the speed 
perturbation, there is potential support for it in terms of the manipulation of the number of actors 
visible. The presence of two actors lowered the accuracy for competitive displays while 
increasing the accuracy in cooperative displays. There was also a longer RT found for 
competitive displays, especially the ones containing only one actor. This may suggest 
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participants are more likely to infer cooperative intentionality when observing two individuals 
engaging in a task together. Whether this is a form of cue-based inference or reveals the 
possibility that observers may perceive an interpersonal affordance between two actors is 
unclear. Overall, the findings suggest participants are relying on cues, namely speed, to make 
their judgment. 
Limitations 
A few limitations were encountered in the process of conducting this study. First, the 
competitive displays appeared to be in “slow motion” when the speed was perturbed compared to 
the more natural appearance of the perturbed cooperative displays. This also relates to the second 
issue regarding the creation of the stimuli. Stimuli were created using reflective tape and were 
edited by speeding up and slowing down video footage. A research-quality motion tracking 
system could provide more realistic displays and thus make the kinematic information more 
pronounced. Finally, all the video clips presented contain the same two actors toggling between 
intentions. It is possible the one or both of the actors exhibited movement artifacts that biased 
judgments.  
Future Research 
For future research, it is recommended that researchers address the limitations previously 
stated. In order to obtain more authentic intentions, it is suggested that actors complete a survey 
about their level of competitiveness and cooperativeness. Those who score higher on 
competitiveness will be recorded for the competitive condition. Likewise, individuals who score 
higher on the cooperative trait will be recorded for the cooperative condition. A research-quality 
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tracking system is also recommended in order to capture each actor’s motion. This will prevent 
any artifacts in action kinematics and provide a more realistic picture in the perturbed displays.  
Further, the importance of interaction in social perception needs to be emphasized. In the 
current study, we employed an interactive task between two actors. However, the research 
participant remained a third-person observer of this interaction. It is possible that the novelty of 
the task made it difficult for participants to recognize any potential invariant patterns that specify 
competitiveness and cooperativeness, respectively. An improved design may involve allowing 
the participant to engage in the block-placing task under both competitive and cooperative 
instructions. This would allow them to attune to the information, assuming it is present. Previous 
event perception work has emphasized the importance of perceptual learning and attunement to 
task-specific information, especially in experimentally contrived tasks and displays (Bingham, 
McConnell, & Muchisky, 2001). It was previously discussed that research on ToM often 
involved participants making judgments from a third-person perspective and using static images. 
While the actors in the video were engaging in the action, the participant still observed from a 
third person perspective. It is possible interpersonal affordances are more likely to be perceived 
when the individual is the one actively participating in the interaction. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of the current study was to determine whether social perception is direct or 
if individuals use inferential processes to understand others’ intentions. The study also sought to 
determine if interpersonal affordances are present and perceived by individuals during social 
interaction. The results rejected both hypotheses, thus suggesting social perception is indirect and 
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requires inference.  
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Figure 1. Significant interaction between movement intention and speed manipulation on 
percent correct data. The effect of the speed perturbation is more pronounced for cooperative 
displays. 
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Figure 2. Significant interaction between movement intention and number of actors 
visible in the display on percent correct data. The presence of two actors decreased accuracy in 
competitive displays but increased accuracy in cooperative displays. 
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Figure 3. Interaction between movement intention and speed manipulation on RT data. 
Note the increase in RT in particular for the perturbed competitive displays. 
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Figure 4 and Figure 5. Significant three-way interaction on the RT data, revealing longest 
RT for competitive 1-actor perturbed displays. The effect of the speed perturbation is most 
pronounced in the competitive 1 actor condition. 
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